1. The ruling created a new procedure requiring the Attorney General to prove a new method of execution is constitutional. This overthrows 130 years of precedent set by the Nebraska Supreme Court holding that legislation is presumed to be constitutional.

2. The ruling overturned a long series of cases that say the Nebraska Constitution offers criminals no greater protection than the federal constitution. With the recent ruling, the court says the Nebraska Constitution offers criminals greater protection than the same language in our federal constitution.

3. The ruling erred in only looking to other federal court cases and other state legislatures to decide what "standards of decency" are in Nebraska. The ruling relied on no Nebraska statutes, no Nebraska court rulings and no other indicators of what Nebraskans think about the issue. The Nebraska Constitution isn't a statement of national values. It's a statement of Nebraska values. Other states don't set "standards of decency" for Nebraskans.

4. The ruling gave no clear guidance on what standard would be applied to evaluate a new method of execution. For example, the ruling speaks of "a substantial risk of unnecessary pain," but fails to say what type or level of "necessary" pain would be acceptable.

5. The high court decided this case on a state constitutional theory Raymond Mata never raised and the state was never given the opportunity to address.

We therefore hold that although §502(a)(2) does not provide a remedy for individual injuries distinct from plan injuries, that provision does authorize recovery for fiduciary breaches that impair the value of plan assets in a participant's individual account.

New constitutional rules announced by this Court that place certain kinds of primary individual conduct beyond the power of the States to proscribe, as well as "watershed" rules of criminal procedure, must be applied in all future trials, all cases pending on direct review, and all federal habeas corpus proceedings. All other new rules of criminal procedure must be applied in future trials and in cases pending on direct review, but may not provide the basis for a federal collateral attack on a state-court conviction. This is the substance of the "Teague rule" described by Justice O'Connor in her plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288 (1989). The question in this case is whether Teague constrains the authority of state courts to give broader effect to new rules of criminal procedure than is required by that opinion. We have never suggested that it does, and now hold that it does not.