Tory v. Cochran, Supreme Court of the United States, May 31, 2005 [ruling striking down an order in a libel case permanently forbidding public comments and picketing against attorney Johnnie Cochran as it was overly broad]. Excerpt from the court's opinion by Justice Breyer:

Since picketing Cochran and his law offices while engaging in injunction-forbidden speech could no longer achieve the objectives that the trial court had in mind (i.e., coercing Cochran to pay a “tribute” for desisting in thisactivity), the grounds for the injunction are much diminished, if they have not disappeared altogether. Consequently the injunction, as written, now amounts to an overly broad prior restraint upon speech, lacking plausible justification. See Nebraska Press Assn. v. Stuart, 427 U. S. 539, 559 (1976) (“[P]rior restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights”); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U. S. 376, 390 (1973) (a prior restraint should not “swee[p]” any “more broadly than necessary”). As such, the Constitution forbids it.

Read the full text of the opinion here [PDF]. Reported in JURIST’s Paper Chase here.