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Kosovo as a Complex Case

JURIST Guest Columnist John Cerone of New England School of Law, formerly a Human Rights Legal Advisor with the UN Mission in Kosovo, says that given the legal and moral complexity of the Kosovo situation, recent suggestions that Kosovo's unilateral declaration of independence from Serbia is unlawful but may nonetheless be "justified" are problematic...


From the moment the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia began in 1999, the independence of Kosovo seemed a highly likely eventuality. Since that time, developments on the ground have effectively precluded virtually any other possibility. As such, an independent Kosovo does seem inevitable. However, a number of commentators have recently opined that although the purported secession of Kosovo may well be unlawful, it is nonetheless just. Both of these propositions – that it was not in conformity with international law and that it was "justified" – are open to question.

International law has very little to say about the legality of secession. Traditionally, the international community simply sits back and waits to see if the secession is effective. This neutrality derives largely from the principle of non-intervention – that states must generally refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of other states. To posit that Kosovo’s secession is not in conformity with international law implies that there is some international legal procedure for secession that was not observed. No such procedure exists. While it may be argued that the Security Council’s pronouncements have anticipated a “political settlement” on the future status of Kosovo, there is no indication as to what this settlement should entail or whose consent would be required.

While it would be difficult to characterize the declaration of independence as unlawful, recognition of Kosovo’s independence by other states is a separate legal question. Here the question of conformity with international law is a bit murkier. As with secession, international law has little to say about the legality of other states’ recognition of newly independent states. Recognition of newly independent states is generally lawful, so long as that new state has effectively established its independence in fact. The only exception to this rule would be in specific cases where the Security Council has created an obligation not to recognize a particular state (e.g., as happened in the case of Southern Rhodesia). Whether Kosovan authorities have in fact established effective control over the territory is a matter of some debate, but it is not clear either way.

Even less clear is the question of whether Kosovo’s independence is justified. Those claiming that it is justified typically ground their position in a black-and-white view of the Kosovo conflict that tends to obscure a much more complex reality.

I have to admit that, upon my arrival in Kosovo in the summer of 1999, I had very much shared this simplistic view of the situation. Indeed, my work there on war crimes documentation was largely driven by a desire to secure accountability for the seemingly steady stream of international crimes being broadcast by the international media.

I was initially stationed in western Kosovo, where I, along with throngs of other international aid workers, was welcomed as a benefactor and friend of the Albanians; that is, until I questioned the acceptability of blowing up the town’s Serbian Orthodox Church. Any suggestion that Kosovo Serbs should benefit from the protection of human rights law was met with open hostility.

I later moved north to Mitrovica, the ethnically divided city bisected by the River Ibar, with Kosovo Serbs living to the north and Kosovo Albanians living to the south. Working regularly with individuals from all ethnic groups, I was one of very few people who crossed the Ibar on a daily basis. The few Kosovo Albanians who remained in the north lived in a state of continuous insecurity. Kosovo Serbs fared less well in the south. Shortly before I arrived in Mitrovica, a Kosovo Serb was discovered south of the Ibar, and was consequently beaten to death by an angry mob.

The work of documenting past abuses was quickly supplemented by the need to respond to the spike in crimes against ethnic minorities, including Kosovo Serbs. Over the course of the following 18 months, the killing and displacement of Kosovo Serbs, and other ethnic minorities, continued unabated, notwithstanding the presence of tens of thousands of NATO soldiers.

Further reflection was prompted once the percentage of the Kosovo Serb population that had been murdered or displaced surpassed the percentage of the Kosovo Albanian population that had been killed or displaced in the years leading up to the NATO intervention. While only a tiny percentage of Kosovo Albanians were directly responsible for the killings, the perpetrators were protected by the majority of the population who saw these crimes as unfortunate, but understandable. Even when these perpetrators killed an elderly Serb woman in Pristina – a woman who could have played no role in the conflict, and who had never left her apartment for fear of attack -- her murder was portrayed as forgivable in light of what ‘her people’ had done.

To the extent that prior abuses could serve as a “justification” for Kosovo to secede from Serbia, it could equally serve as a justification for the northern part of Kosovo, populated mainly by Kosovo Serbs, to secede from the rest of Kosovo.

Of greater concern, however, is that the portrayal of Kosovo’s secession as justified typically rests on a conception of independence as a much deserved reward for the Albanians and fitting punishment for the Serbs. This view of the situation makes it far too easy to disregard the plight of minority groups in Kosovo and feeds into the destructive mentality of collective responsibility.

If we as outsiders cannot distinguish between individual and collective responsibility, how can we expect otherwise from those directly involved?


John Cerone is Associate Professor of Law & Director of the Center for International Law & Policy at the New England School of Law. He previously served as a Human Rights Legal Advisor with the UN Mission in Kosovo.

February 22, 2008


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Comments:

In his article Prof. Cerone states that “ while it may be argued that the Security Council’s pronouncements have anticipated a “political settlement” on the future status of Kosovo, there is no indication as to what this settlement should entail or whose consent would be required.” He also states that “to posit that Kosovo’s secession is not in conformity with international law implies that there is some international legal procedure for secession that was not observed. No such procedure exists.”

Both these issues are addressed by by the Supreme Court of Canada in the Quebec Advisoru Opininion 1998.

The political settlement between the parties should have been reached by negotiations. The Quebec Opinion states in paragraphs 90 and 91 that “ the conduct of the parties in such negotiations would be governed by the same constitutional principles which give rise to the duty to negotiate: federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and the protection of minorities…” The Court held “that Quebec could not purport to invoke a right of self-determination such as to dictate the terms of a proposed secession to the other parties: that would not be a negotiation at all.” Same pertains to Kosovo. The Kosovo delegation should have negotiated in good faith with Serbia. That was not the case due to obvious incitements to secession by some states, unfortunately by the US in the first place.

In the paragraph 95 of its Opinion the Supreme Court of Canada goes on to state: “ Refusal of a party to conduct negotiations in a manner consistent with constitutional principles and values would seriously put at risk the legitimacy of that party's assertion of its rights, and perhaps the negotiation process as a whole. Those who quite legitimately insist upon the importance of upholding the rule of law cannot at the same time be oblivious to the need to act in conformity with constitutional principles and values, and so do their part to contribute to the maintenance and promotion of an environment in which the rule of law may flourish.”

There is no doubt that the Kosovo representatives did not negotiate in the above manner. The UN envoy’s Ahtisaari plan followed, but that plan was never adopted by any organ of the UN. Therefore, the declaration of independence of Kosovo is based on the dead letter.

It is true that international law contains neither a right of unilateral secession nor the explicit denial of such a right, although such a denial is, to some extent, implicit in the exceptional circumstances required for secession to be permitted under the right of a people to self-determination. International law places great importance on the territorial integrity of nation states and, by and large, leaves the creation of a new state to be determined by the domestic law of the existing state of which the seceding entity presently forms a part (R. Y. Jennings, The Acquisition of Territory in International Law (1963), at pp. 8-9). Where unilateral secession would be incompatible with the domestic Constitution, international law is likely to accept that conclusion subject to the right of peoples to self-determination.

The Serbian Constitution forbids the secession and the Quebec Opinion recognizes only two category of peoples to which the right to external self-determination apply: 1/ those under colonial rule or 2/ foreign occupation. Kosovo Albanians do not fall in neither of these two categories and their claim to independence is therefore illegal.

It is therefore surprising, if not shocking, that Gen. Wesley Clarke, Mr. Dan Serwer and the UK and US Ambassadors to the UN claim that the Kosovo independence is legal acccording to Resolution 1244, when in fact the 1244 expressly reaffirms the commitment of the UN Member States to the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Yugoslavia, now Serbia, as set out in the Helsinki Final Act.

There were crimes on both sides in Kosovo. However, the “popular” one-sided media reports cannot be adopted by academic writers. No one serious can dispute today that mass movements of the Kosovo population took place only after the Operation Allied Force (“The Merciful Angel”) had begun. The former Ambassador of Canada James Bisset wrote in the Otawa Citizen on 18 February 2008: “Although the western media continue to justify the independence of Kosovo on the grounds of ethnic cleansing and atrocities committed by Slobodan Milosevic's security forces the facts do not support these allegations. They do stand, however, as testimony to the success of NATO's propaganda machine.

The intervention in Kosovo had nothing to do with humanitarian reasons but was deliberately designed to justify the continued existence of NATO and to fundamentally change its role from a purely defensive organization acting in accordance with the UN Charter into one that could intervene wherever or whenever it decided to do so, and with or without UN approval.”

As a former UN Human Rights advisor in Kosovo, Prof. Cerone is well placed to tell us whether it is true that 250,000 Serbs were expelled and about 1,500 killed since the arrival of UNMIK and KFOR and whether about 150 Christian churches and monesteries were ruined.

It is unfortunate that the US Embassy in Belgrade was attacked by some participants after the peaceful demonstrations on 21 February 2008, attended by several hundred thousand people. It is also unfortunate that we see such a massive disrespect for international law in 21st Century.

Goran Cvetic, LL.M.(LSE)
Advocate
Belgrade

February 22, 2008  

Thank you for your thought-provoking comment.

A careful read of the holdings of the Quebec Secession Opinion will reveal that they are consistent with the positions outlined in my opinion above. We must be careful to distinguish between the requirements of domestic constitutional law and those of international law. While international law may not grant a right to secede, and may even, in certain contexts, be said to deny the existence of such a right, this alone does not amount to a prohibition. For those interested in reading the Quebec opinion for themselves, please see: http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1998/1998rcs2-217/1998rcs2-217.html.

February 24, 2008  

Dear Prof. Cerone,

Thank you for your comment.

I deeply believe that the Qubec Opinion was delivered with a noble intention: that no unilateral secession or recognition of it would be the cause of bloody wars in the future. The SC Resolution 1244 is clear in that it recalls the Helsinki Final Act, the most powerful protectors of borders in Europe since 1975. Independence of Kosovo is not mentioned by a single word in it.

By no means I wish to have a final word in this discussion.

In his comment on Prof. Michael J. Kelly’s article on Kosovo of 17 February 2008 Prof. Guarino of the Naples University Federico II stated that the issue of Kosovo Albanians is a minority issue and should be dealt with as such. It seems that his comment was led by the realization that the Albanians have one state already as an expression of their right to self-determination as a people.

In the end, let me quote these thoughts ”from the house”: "We have in Serbia a situation in which the U.S. has forced an action --the proclamation of independence by the Kosovo Albanians -- that is in clear violation of the most fundamental principles of international law after World War II," argues Robert Hayden, Director of the Center for Russian and East European Studies at the University of Pittsburgh. "Borders cannot be changed by force and without consent -- that principle was actually the main stated reason for the 1991 U.S. attack on Iraq."

Goran Cvetic
Advocate
Belgrade

February 25, 2008  

There is nothing "complex" about Kosovo's unlawful secession from Yugoslavia/Serbia or our/NATO's war crime Kosovo "war" which enabled that.

Kosovo was "The First Neocon War," forced on the Yugoslavs/Serbs with Appendix B of the Rambouillet Treaty: our unconditional occupation -- unconditional surrender -- ultimatum, which Blair and Clinton well knew the Serbs would never accept.

Just as the postwar Polish Communist government was illicit, because it was created amidst the 1943 furor about the Soviets' 1940 genocidal massacres of the Polish intelligentsia at Katyn and elsewhere, so now the Albanian Kosovo government is illegitimate.

Worse, Kosovo could be classified a criminal (and even more illicit) state, with its booming trade in narcotics and now its unchecked raping and drugging -- white-slaving -- of European girls into prostitution. (NATO troops have been some of its best customers, and according to Ian Cobain in a now-disappeared Nov02 TimesOnline article, typically brutal Albanian thugs were already taking over and running 70% of London's prostitutes.)

The Kosovo war was naked aggression on a moral and legal par with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It would be like Mormons asking Russians and Chinese to militarily intervene in the U.S. and enable them to have independence. We betrayed the Atlantic Charter and everything we once stood for in the world. Iraq has just been further, inescapable proof of our criminality, the way we have spurned and mocked even the Geneva Convention.

The die has been cast. Our "neoconservatives" -- they are NOT "conservative" -- have managed to enmire us in a disastrous war of attrition and turn most of the world against us.

The war crimes trials China and Russia will hold for us will be a nightmare entirely different from Nuremberg.

February 27, 2008  


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